Constitutional Rights of Persons Before a Court Martial by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1953 Article 6 
Constitutional Rights of Persons Before a Court Martial 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Constitutional Rights of Persons Before a Court Martial, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 95 
(1953) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol3/iss1/6 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
COMMENTS
for a period of time before the transfer,40 or where the donor had a
serious disease which was the direct cause of death but which was un-
known to him at the time of transfer.41 A transfer, however, by a person
of advanced age who is knowingly suffering from a disease likely to
cause death will almost always be included as a gift in contemplation of
death.42
In summarizing the cases it is apparent that although the Com-
missioner frequently assesses a deficiency based upon a claim of con-
templation of death, the courts have set up a reasonable standard for
the determination of the issue. If the estate representative produces proof
that the motives of the decedent were those associated with life and
that decedent, although of advanced age, was in generally good health
or, if suffering from a serious ailment, was unaware of it or optimistic
about recovery, the estate representative will be able to overcome the
presumption in favor of the Commissioner. Furthermore the amendment
enacted in the Revenue Act of 1950 will relieve estates of the expense of
litigation in cases where the transfer was completed more than three
years prior to donor's death and permit persons now living to give
greater consideration to estate planning by making gifts inter vivos as
a means of reducing their Federal Estate Tax.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS BEFORE A
COURT MARTIAL
From the inception of the draft in 1940 to the present, millions of men
have been or are in military service. Upon entering the military life the
soldier loses his rights under the civil courts and becomes amenable to
court martial. Many questions arise as to the constitutional rights of mil-
itary personnel. When all appellate remedies within the framework of
the military courts have been exhausted, there remains only one remedy
to secure the constitutional rights of those convicted-the writ of habeas
corpus.,
Much confusion has plagued the courts in determining the constitutional
rights of persons tried by a court martial. Much of this confusion is
attributable to the uncertainty of the scope of the habeas corpus review.
In the case of In re Grimely2 the court concluded that the habeas
40 Llewellyn v. United States, 40 F. 2d 555 (D.C. Tenn., 1929).
41 Levi v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 513 (Ct. Cl., 1936).
42 Estate of Wright, 43 B.T.A. 551 (1941).
162 Stat. 964 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. S 2241 (1950). "The writ of habeas corpus shall
not extend to a prisoner unless he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the
Treaties of the United States."
2 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
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corpus writ was limited to a determination of whether or not the mil-
itary court had the right to try the accused for the offense charged and
the inquiry was not to extend beyond that point. A later decision modified
this concept to include within the scope of habeas corpus the possible
deprivation of constitutional rights.3 The rationale of this decision was
that if a court martial had infringed upon the constitutional rights of a
person it had thereby exceeded its jurisdiction. Hence the court martial
would be without authority to order the confinement of the petitioner.
As a result of this broadened scope of habeas corpus inquiry the courts
began to determine the constitutional rights of military personnel tried
by a court martial.
When dealing with the rights specifically enumerated in the Con-
stitution the courts at present recognize them as being applicable to the
military. Cruel and unusual punishment is specifically prohibited by the
Constitution.4 In Ex Parte Dickey5 it was held that a civil court could
not inquire into the severity of a sentence imposed by a court martial.
If the court martial was authorized by law to impose the sentence there
would be no defect in jurisdiction and no right in the civil court to go
beyond that determination. In Powers v. Hunter" the petitioner had been
given the maximum sentence allowed by statute. Here the court held that
it could inquire whether the sentence was so severe as to offend the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In this
case the departure from the strict test of jurisdiction laid down in the
earlier decisions is clearly illustrated.
On the question of double jeopardy, United States v. Maney7 is merely
a reiteration of the earlier decisions which limited the civil courts to
the jurisdictional test. But in the case of Hunter v. Wade8 is reflected
the later concept of the scope of the habeas corpus inquiry. It was
determined in the Hunter case that a federal court had the power to de-
cide if the defendant had been placed in double jeopardy by the military
tribunal. On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States agreed with
the lower court's holding on the applicability of the double jeopardy
provision to military personnel, but the high court found as a matter of
law that the accused had not been placed in double jeopardy.
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches'0 as applied
to military prisoners was treated in the case of Richardson v. Zupp" and
though the court seemed to regard this protection as being available to
3 In re Wrublewski, 71 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Calif., 1947).
4.U.S. Const., Amend. 8. 8 169 F. 2d 973 (C.A. 10th, 1948).
5 204 Fed. 322 (D.C. Maine, 1913). 9 Hunter v. Wade, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
6 178 F. 2d 141 (C.A. 10th, 1949). 10 U.S. Const. Amend. 4.
7 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. Minn., 1894). 1181 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa., 1949).
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the prisoner it was decided that the facts did not warrant a finding that
such protection had been denied him.
Although the specific guarantees of the Constitution have been extended
to military personnel the less definite but basic rights embraced by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment have not received similar
treatment.
In this area the courts have plotted an uncertain path when faced
with specific issues. Some decisions have propounded the rule that a per-
son tried by a court martial has none of the due process protections of the
Constitution, but that the military law alone constitutes due process for
such person.' 2 The strongest case recognizing the due process clause
as applying to persons before a court martial is United States v. Hiatt."3
Here the court held:
An individual does not cease to be a person within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment because he joins the nation's armed forces .... The guaran-
tee that 'no person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law,' makes no exceptions in the case of persons in the armed
forces.... We conclude that it is open for a civil court in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to consider whether the circumstances in a court martial proceeding
and the manner in which it was conducted ran afoul of the basic standard of
fairness which is involved in the constitutional concept of due process of
law .... 14
The courts have stated the principle that military personnel do not
have the same due process of law safeguards that a civilian has,15 the
theory being that the rights of men in the armed forces must be con-
ditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.
Earlier, once it had been recognized that civil courts had some appellate
power over military courts in matters other than merely that of jurisdic-
tion, the view took hold that the difference in due process rights between
civil and military personnel was only in the realm of procedural due
process, and in matters of substance the difference evaporated.16 The pro-
cedural due process variation was explained by the theory that each
system of jurisprudence is free to establish its own rules of procedure as
long as a fair trial can be obtained. 17 However, this rationale has not been
borne out and present day cases do not support this view. By their de-
cisions recent cases have held substantive due process of law is also to
be measured differently according to whether it be a civilian or soldier
before the court upon a writ of habeas corpus.
12 United States ex rel French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); and see concurring
opinion of Minton, J., in Burns v. Wilson, 73 S. Ct. 1045 (1953).
13 141 F. 2d 664 (C.A. 3d, 1944).
14 Ibid., at 666. 15 Burns v. Wilson, 73 S. Ct. 1045 (1953).
16 Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa., 1946).
17 Andrus v. McCauley, 21 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Wash., 1936).
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In the case of Burns v. Wilson'8 a soldier was held incommunicado for
five days at the end of which period he signed a confession. The court
martial admitted the confession over the objection of defense counsel
and testimony of the defendant that it had been coerced and involuntary.
Upon habeas corpus such action was held to be no denial of due process
under the Fifth Amendment. In contrast, however, it has been held that
the admission of such confessions in state courts is a violation of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.19 In the Burns case
the court stated that the ruling in McNabb v. United States, 20 which held
inadmissible a confession obtained from a person held incommunicado
by federal authorities for five days, did not control. The court reasoned
that the McNabb decision resulted solely from the fact that a federal
statute requiring immediate arraignment had been violated. But the
McNabb case specifically stated it was not deciding the constitutional
issue when the case could be decided upon the basis of the violation of the
federal statute. Also, Mr. Justice Reed in his dissent in the McNabb case
lamented the decision being made upon the basis of the statute. The dissent
stated that the court should have determined whether the facts constituted
a violation of due process.
Concerning the right to adequate counsel, the court in Hiatt v. Brown,21
granted a writ of habeas corpus when it found that the petitioner had
incompetent counsel at his court martial. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the court below, holding that it was error to review the com-
petency of counsel to determine compliance with due process of law.
22
In cases before the civil courts it has been held that the right to com-
petent counsel is a part of due process of law. These cases view the
defendant's right to a fair trial as being violated by not having competent
counsel. 23 Again there has emerged the philosophy that constitutional
rights vary according to the status of the particular defendant.
Under the Articles of War 24 and the current Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice 28 a system of pre-trial investigation has been provided by
Congress.
18 73 S. Ct. 1045 (1953).
19 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 69 (1948);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1948).
20 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
21 175 F. 2d 273 (C.A. 5th, 1949).
22 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
23 United States ex rel Feeley v. Regan, 166 F. 2d 976 (C.A. 7th, 1948).
2441 Stat. 802 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. S 1542 (1927). "No charge shall be referred to
trial until a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall be made."
2564 Stat. 118 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. S 603 (1951). "No charge or specification shall
be referred to a general court martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investi-
gation of all matters set forth has been made ......
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Prior to 1949 the courts freely reviewed by way of habeas corpus the
adequacy of pre-trial investigation.2 6 In 1949, Humphrey v. Smith 2  held
that civil courts are precluded from inquiry into the adequacy of a
pre-trial investigation. The court further voiced the view that even the
failure to hold a pre-trial investigation would not destroy the jurisdic-
tion of a court martial. The court concluded that such investigations
should be left to the good faith of the army. A strong dissent by three
judges was made to this case, and the dissent, it is submitted, seems to be
the more desirable view.28 The majority opinion has been reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in a later case.29 Apparently, the present court does not
regard the failure of a military court to observe the procedure prescribed
by Congress as a violation of due process of law.
Erroneous rulings by a court martial on the admission or the ex-
clusion of evidence are held not to be reviewable by the civil courts.8 0
It is reasoned that any such error would not go to the jurisdiction of the
court martial, the only issue before a civil court in a habeas corpus
petition. Here again we have an application of the limited scope which
existed earlier. In an earlier decision it had been deemed proper for a civil
court to determine if there was any evidence to sustain a conviction.81
This rule was predicated upon the theory that a person convicted with-
out any evidence has been deprived of his liberty without due process
of law and is consonant with decisions involving persons convicted by
a civil court.8 2
In summation, the constitutional protections of those in the military
service seem to have passed through several phases of recognition. In the
early cases no redress of violations was available. The strict test of jurisdic-
tion over the defendant effectively prevented inquiry into the deprivation
of constitutional rights. After it had been firmly established that due
process of law in civil cases included substantive rights, the courts began
to inquire into the observance of these rights in court martials. Con-
currently, the courts also made inquiry where specific guarantees of the
Constitution were raised in a habeas corpus petition. Commencing with
the case of Humphrey v. Smith 3 in 1949 there has been a noticeable
trend back to the strict test of jurisdiction where due process of law
26 Henry v. Hodges, 171 F. 2d 401 (CA. 2d, 1948).
27 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
28 "Congressional belief in the importance of preliminary investigation should not
now be frustrated by a holding that noncompliance cannot be attacked by habeas
corpus." Ibid., at 703.
2 9 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
30McCellen v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Pa., 1949).
31 Hayes v. Hunter, 83 F. Supp. 940 (D.C. Kan., 1948).
32Ex parte Jones, 96 Fed. 200 (C.C. Ala., 1899). 83 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
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has been put in issue. But where a specific guarantee of the Constitution
is alleged the present day courts will probably make inquiry concerning
its violation.
The attitude that all citizens except those in the military forces shall
have their substantial rights protected seems inconsistent with the spirit of
the Constitution. In this area a serious reappraisal of the consequences of
this view seems necessary. One remedy might be a post-conviction hear-
ing act similar in principle to the statute recently enacted in Illinois.8 4 The
Illinois act originated from the confusion generated by the inability of the
courts to adjudicate properly the claims of prisoners that constitutional
rights had been violated at their trial. This method of review provides
a simple, direct hearing and obviates the limitations of habeas corpus.
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
It is well known and well settled that a criminal act and intent are
essential elements for the commission of a crime, and want of either of
these elements is fatal to criminal prosecution. A successful defense to
criminal prosecution is entrapment, the seduction or improper induce-
ment by officers of the law to commit a crime,1 when it can be shown
by the accused that the original intention was not his, or that there was
lacking on his part some act necessary to complete the crime.
If the criminal intent originates in the mind of the law enforcer or
entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense, there can be no conviction.2 Rex v. Martin,3 an old English
case, readily illustrates such entrapment wrongful because of the origin
of intent. A prisoner of war, in England, was directed by his keepers to
go beyond the parole limits merely so that he could be prosecuted for
escape. The prisoner, once beyond the limits, was promptly arrested.
The court, however, held that he could not be convicted for escaping
or attempting to escape because he had not intended to escape.
Generally, courts have no difficulty in refusing to convict a person
where the genesis of the idea or real origin of the criminal act clearly
springs, not from the accused, but from the entrapper, and his purpose
is to arrest merely for the sake of arresting. Such over-zealous behavior
by law officers is not tolerated by the courts in most jurisdictions. 4 Some
jurisdictions, however, refuse to excuse the commission of a crime when
the initiative or intent did not spring from the accused, and the entrapper's
84 1l. Rev. Stat. (1951), c. 38, S§ 826-832.
1 Morei v. United States, 127 F. 2d 827 (C.A. 6th, 1942).
2 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law S 336 (1938). 3 168 Eng. Rep. 757 (1811).
4 Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896); Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App.
137, 13 S. 2d 54 (1943).
